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METROPOLITAN LIFE AND THE SHADOW 
BANKING CONTROVERSY: NON-BANK 






Roy J. Girasa* 
Richard J. Kraus** 




 “Shadow banking” has a great variety of definitions. 
The term was originally coined in 2007 by Paul A. McCulley, 
who attended the Kansas City Federal Reserve Bank annual 
symposium in Jackson Hole, Wyoming. The meeting discussed 
the financial crisis then occurring nationally and globally. It 
focused on systemic risk and, in particular, what the author  
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dubbed the “shadow banking system” which he noted was “the 
whole alphabet soup of levered-up non-bank investment 
conduits, vehicles, and structures.”1  
In a series of Staff Reports issued by the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York, the authors defined “shadow 
banks” as “financial intermediaries that provide maturity, 
credit, and liquidity transformation without explicit access to 
central bank liquidity or public service credit guarantees.”2 
Two of these staff authors in a later report defined the term as 
“a web of specialized financial institutions that channel funding 
from savers to investors through a range of securitization and 
secured funding techniques.”3 A comparable variety of 
definitions: “The system of non-deposit taking financial 
intermediaries including investment banks, hedge funds, 
monoline insurance firms and other securities operators”;4 “all 
financial activities, except traditional banking, which require a 
private or public backstop to operate.”5  “The financial 
intermediaries involved in facilitating the creation of credit 
across the global financial system, but whose members are not 
subject to regulatory oversight. The shadow banking system 
also refers to unregulated activities by regulated institutions.”6 
This article will examine the present controversy 
between the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) and 
the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company (MetLife) 
concerning the council’s final determination concerning the 
need for the council to oversee MetLife’s shadow banking 
activities and the company’s continuing efforts to contest the 
rights of the Council to regulate the company’s activities. The 
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article will conclude that regulation is indeed necessary in light 
of comparable international regulation and the financial 
ramifications of the company’s activities. 
 
THE METROPOLITAN LIFE CONTROVERSY 
 
The Dodd-Frank Act Empowerment of the Council 
 
The FSOC was established pursuant to §111 of the 
Dodd-Frank Act. The Council’s Board of Governors, among 
other matters, identifies risks to U.S. financial stability, 
promotes market discipline, and responds to threats to the 
stability of the U.S. financial system.7 With respect to nonbank 
financial institutions, the Act requires supervision “for nonbank 
companies that may pose risks to the financial stability of the 
United States in the event of their material financial distress or 
failure”….8 The Board of Governors may make 
recommendations for the establishment of heightened 
prudential standards for risk-based capital and other financial 
instruments.  
 
 Factors that the Council considers in making a 
determination of whether a U.S. company is to be supervised 
by the Board of Governors of the Council include (a) the extent 
of the leverage of the company; (b) the extent and nature of the 
off-balance-sheet exposures of the company; (c) the extent and 
nature of the transactions and relationships of the company 
with other significant nonbank financial companies and 
significant bank holding companies; (d) the importance of the 
company as a source of credit for households, businesses, and 
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State and local governments and as a source of liquidity for the 
United States financial system; (e) the importance of the 
company as a source of credit for low-income, minority, or 
underserved communities, and the impact that the failure of 
such company would have on the availability of credit in such 
communities; (f) the extent to which assets are managed rather 
than owned by the company, and the extent to which 
ownership of assets under management is diffuse; (g) the 
nature, scope, size, scale, concentration, interconnectedness, 
and mix of the activities of the company; (h) the degree to 
which the company is already regulated by 1 or more primary 
financial regulatory agencies; (i) the amount and nature of the 
financial assets of the company; (j) the amount and types of the 
liabilities of the company, including the degree of reliance on 
short-term funding; and (k) any other risk-related factors that 
the Council deems appropriate.9  
 
FSOC’s MetLife Inc. Final Determination  
 
     On December 18, 2014, the Council designated MetLife as 
a nonbank systemically important financial institution. MetLife 
is the fourth nonbank to receive the designation as systemically 
important. The other nonbanks to receive the designation are 
Prudential Financial, Inc. (September 19, 2013); General 
Electric Capital Corporation, Inc. (July 8, 2013); and American 
International Group, Inc. (July 8, 2013).10 The Council sought 
to regulate MetLife as it had regulated other corporations in 
order to encourage financial stability.11  
Under §102(a) (6) of the Dodd-Frank Act, a company is 
predominantly engaged in financial activities if (a) the annual 
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gross revenues derived by the company and all of its 
subsidiaries from activities that are financial in nature…and, if 
applicable, from the ownership or control of one or more 
insured depository institutions, represents 85 percent or more 
of the consolidated annual gross revenues of the company; or 
(b) the consolidated assets of the company and all of its 
subsidiaries related to activities that are financial in nature … 
and, if applicable, related to the ownership or control of one or 
more insured depository institutions, represents 85 percent or 
more of the consolidated assets of the company. 
 
With respect to MetLife, the Council issued a lengthy 
analysis which included over 21,000 pages of the company’s 
submissions. The Council determined that material financial 
distress at MetLife could pose a threat to the financial stability 
of the United States. The company, therefore, should be subject 
to the enhanced prudential standards of FSOC.12 The Council 
observed that the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company 
(MetLife) is a global entity that provides insurance and many 
other insurance-related and financial products to some 100 
million customers to over 50 countries. As of 2014, in fact, it 
possessed some $902 billion in total assets and that its assets 
and activities met the 85 percent threshold of Dodd-Frank.  
 
MetLife responded quickly to the determination. In its 
January 13, 2015 complaint filed in the United States District 
Court for the District of Columbia, the company sought review 
of the determination in accord with provisions of the Dodd 
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, the 
Administrative Procedure Act and the United States 
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Constitution. The company designated the determination as 
arbitrary and capricious and not in accord with MetLife’s status 
as an insurance company rather than as a company 
predominantly engaged in financial activities as defined by the 
Dodd Frank Act itself and the Bank Holding Company Act. 
The company noted, furthermore, that the action by FSOC 
follows the recommendations of the Financial Stability Board 
(FSB), a mostly European body of bank regulators and central 
banks in which the U.S. Department of the Treasury and the 
Federal Reserve are members. The FSB had published an 
initial list of nine global systematically important insurance 
companies that are systematically important financial 
institutions. Its recommendations had no force of law and 
MetLife had no opportunity to challenge the FSB 
recommendations.13  
 
The seventy-nine page ten-count complaint contended 
that FSOC’s final determination to designate MetLife as a 
nonbank systemically important financial institution was  
arbitrary and capricious because, among other matters, (a) the 
only independent voting member of the Board of Governors 
with insurance expertise as well as the only nonvoting 
insurance commissioner on the Council both dissented from the 
finding; (b) MetLife was denied due process by the rules and 
obligations under Dodd-Frank, the APA and the due process 
clause of the Constitution; (c) FSOC made numerous errors 
that fatally led to FSOC’s reasoning in its findings; (d)FSOC 
failed to give meaningful weight to the existing comprehensive 
state insurance  regulatory regime; (e) MetLife is not 
predominantly engaged in financial activities as required by 
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statute which of the failure to meet the 85% rule; (f) the FSOC 
failed to undertake activities-based review for insurance 
companies; (g) FSOC failed to assess MetLife’s vulnerability 
to material financial distress; (h) FSOC’s findings relied upon 
unsubstantiated speculation and irrational economic 
predictions14; and (i) FSOC failed to examine consequences of 
its designation decision.   
HISTORICAL SETTING OF TRADITIONAL BANKING 
AS OPPOSED TO SHADOW BANKING 
Traditional Banking 
 Traditional banking has had a checkered history. 
National banking began at the inception of the New Republic. 
The First Bank of the United States (1791-1811) operated 
under the leadership of Alexander Hamilton, who was also the 
first Secretary of the Treasury under President George 
Washington. The issuances of bank notes occurred through 
state banks due to the lack of a national currency. In the 
seminal case of McCulloch v. Maryland,15 the United States 
Supreme Court decided that Congress had the right to create a 
bank under its power to make “all laws which shall be 
necessary and proper, for carrying into execution” its delegated 
powers under Article I of the Constitution. In the midst of the 
Civil War of 1861-1865, Congress enacted the National 
Banking Act16 which established standards for banks including 
minimum capital requirements and the issuance of loans as 
well as the imposition of a 10 % tax on state banknotes that 
effectively removed them from circulation.17    
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 The Federal Reserve Act of 191318 creates the national 
system of banks that has existed to the present day. It requires 
all national banks to be members of the Federal Reserve 
System and to maintain levels of reserve with one of the 12 
Federal Reserve banks. State banks are also eligible to become 
members of the Federal Reserve System with all of the 
attendant benefits including federal protection of deposit. The 
“Fed” conducts monetary policy, supervises and regulates 
banks, protects consumer rights, and provides financial 
services to the government, financial institutions, and makes 
loans to commercial banks. The Great Depression that 
commenced in 1929 and ended with the entry of the U.S. into 
World War II led to Congressional inquiry concerning the 
causes of that Depression. The inquiry noted that there were 
bank panics almost every 20 years. It discovered that among 
the major causes were the heavy investments in securities by 
bank affiliates in the 1920s, serious conflicts of interest 
between banks and their affiliates, speculative investments by 
banks, and high-risk ventures. Accordingly, the Banking Act of 
1933,19 better known as the Glass-Steagall Act, became the law 
of the land.   
Bank Separation into Classes 
 
Glass-Steagall separated banks into commercial banks 
and investments banks. Section 20 of the Act forbade a 
member bank from engaging in the issuance, flotation, 
underwriting, public sale, distribution, or participation of 
stocks, bonds, debentures, notes, or other securities. Section 21 
forbade firms that engaged in the said forbidden activity from 
receiving deposits, certificates of deposits, or other evidences 
of debt. The payment of interest on accounts was restricted by 
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the Act to prevent ruinous competition. As a result bank panics 
that occurred virtually every other decade did not occur from 
1933 until many decades later apparently as a result of the 
removal of the same separation of banks. The passage of the 
Riegel-Neal Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 199420 
repealed the prohibition of interstate banking by permitting 
banks to purchase banks in other states or to establish branches 
therein. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) 
was given jurisdiction over state nonmember banks, the Office 
of the Comptroller of Currency received jurisdiction over state 
nonmember banks, and the Federal Reserve Board over state 
member banks. Applicants for expansion were judged by their 
compliance with the Community Reinvestment Bank of 1977,21 
which mandated reinvestment by out-of-state banks in the local 
communities where they were located.  
Repeal of Glass-Steagall 
In the 1990s U.S. banks complained that they could not 
compete with foreign, especially Japanese multi-service banks 
that offered both commercial and investment banking services. 
The share of total private financial assets held by these banks 
declined from 60 % to 35 % for the period of 1970-1995. As a 
result and after four decades of the Glass-Steagall separation 
without any major run on banks, the Financial Services 
Modernization Act popularly known as the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act of 1999 was enacted.22 The first section of the Act 
repealed the Glass-Steagall separation of commercial and 
investment bank. It permitted the creation of a new “financial 
holding company” whereby the entity may engage in any 
activity that the Federal Reserve Board determines to be 
financial in nature or incidental to such activity. It did provide, 
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however, that the activity not pose a substantial risk to the 
safety or soundness of depositary institutions or to the financial 
system generally. Banks could now offer services that included 
insurance and securities underwriting and merchant banking. 
Before the Glass-Steagall repeal, banks had avoided panics for 
twice the usual time period; the banking crisis of 2007-2009 
raised issues of the soundness of the Glass-Steagall repeal and 
“too-big-to-fail” bank holdings. 
Dodd-Frank and Other Reforms 
Whenever a financial crisis looms, it is almost 
inevitable that governmental regulation is promulgated to solve 
or prevent re-occurrence. The thousand-page Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 201023 was 
signed into law which contained numerous sub-titles that 
sought to alleviate many of the ills affecting the financial 
system. Title VI, known as “Bank and Savings Association 
Holding Company and Depository Institution Regulatory 
Improvements Act of 2010,” explicitly dealt with bank holding 
companies created under Gramm-Leach-Bliley. Rather than 
restore the Glass-Steagall separation of commercial banks from 
investment banks, the major emphasis of Title VI is that a bank 
holding company is to be “well-capitalized and well-
managed.”24 Section 38(b) of the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Act25 defines “well-capitalized” as follows: “An insured 
depository institution is “well-capitalized” if it exceeds the 
required minimum level for each relevant capital measure.” 
Dodd-Frank raised the standard of well-capitalized to be where 
its total risk-based capital ratio is 10 % or greater, a Tier I risk-
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based capital ratio of 6 % or greater, and a leveraged capital 
ratio of 5 % or greater.  
The Volcker Rule 
The already mentioned financial crisis of 2007-2009 led 
to the closures of hundreds of banks, somewhat reminiscent of 
the closures of the Great Depression. Government had to come 
to the rescue of certain banks so that the global financial 
system would not collapse. Some believed that the crisis was 
precipitated by the repeal of Glass-Steagall; they pointed to the 
$6 billion loss by JP Morgan Chase in 2012 with respect to 
speculative trading in the U.K. The “Volcker Rule”, named 
after the former chairman of the Federal Reserve, Paul 
Volcker, was promulgated pursuant to Title VI, §619 of Dodd-
Frank which added a new §13 to the Bank Holding Company 
Act. It prohibited an insured depository institution and holding 
company controlling an insured depository institution from 
engaging in proprietary trading and further prohibited the 
sponsoring and investing in hedge funds and private equity 
funds. The term “proprietary trading” was given a broad 
definition to include acting as a principal or custodian for an 
affiliated third party; for a trading account used by the entity to 
acquire or be financially involved in short-term resale; the 
prohibition of purchasing, selling, or otherwise acquiring or 
disposing of stocks, bonds, and other financial instruments for 
the bank’s own account. The Rule became effective on July 21, 
2012 but allowed banks two years to comply.26   
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Additional Prohibitions 
Section 939(a) of Dodd-Frank amended the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Act to prohibit a savings and loan 
association from acquiring or retaining a corporate debt 
security that does not meet the standards of the FDIC. There 
were detailed considerations set forth in the Act in making the 
said determination. With respect to “too-big-to-fail,” it was 
noted that in 2011 five banks possessed some $8.5 trillion in 
assets (56 % of the U.S. economy).27 §622 of Dodd-Frank, 
“Concentration Limits on Large Financial Institutions,” 
amended the Bank Holding Act of 1956 to forbid the merger, 
consolidation, or acquisition of substantially all assets or 
otherwise acquire control by financial institutions if the total 
consolidated liabilities of the acquiring financial company 
exceeded 10 % of the aggregated consolidated liabilities of all 
financial companies at the end of the prior calendar year. 
Exceptions which led to even greater enlargement of banks 
included acquisition of banks in danger of default. 
 Section 623 of Dodd-Frank amended the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Act to require the responsible agency to 
disapprove an application for an interstate merger transaction if 
the result of the merger is to permit the insured depository 
institution to control more than 10 % of the total amount of 
deposits of the insured depository institutions. Among the 
practices that caused a threat to the U.S. banking sector were 
loans on derivative transactions and other high risk loans. The 
total non-secured loans and extensions of credit made by 
national banks are restricted by statute not to exceed 15% of 
their unimpaired capital and unimpaired surplus. The total 
2016 / Metropolitan Life / 78 
loans and extensions of credit by a national bank fully secured 
by readily marketable collateral having a market value, at least 
at least equal to the amount of the funds outstanding, are not to 
exceed 10% of the unimpaired capital and unimpaired surplus 
of the association. Dodd-Frank includes in the definition of 
"loans and extensions of credit" credit exposure on derivative 
transactions; repurchase agreements; reverse repurchase 
agreements; and securities lending and borrowing transactions. 
State banks are also made subject to the credit exposure limits 
with respect to derivative transactions. The Act also places 
limitations on lending to insiders as well as to purchases of 
assets from them unless the transaction is on market terms, 
represents more than 10% of the capital stock and surplus of 
the covered bank, and has been approved by a majority of the 
board of directors of the institution.   
International Initiatives 
Additional international regulatory requirements also 
appeared. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 
composed of 27 countries and Hong Kong SAR, is a forum that 
calls for cooperation among member countries on banking 
supervisory matters.28 Under the 2004 Basel II Accord, a three-
pillar framework was established that included (1) risk-based 
capital requirements for credit-risk, market risk, and 
operational risk; (2) supervisory review of capital adequacy; 
and (3) market discipline through enhanced public disclosures. 
Basel III entitled “A Global Regulatory Framework for More 
Resilient Banks and Banking Systems, added technical changes 
concerning assignment of risk or certain securitization 
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positions.29 Some of the recommendations of the said Basel 
Accords concerning the market risk framework were adopted 
as a Final Rule by Federal Reserve Board together with the 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and the FDIC that 
required banking organizations with significant trading 
activities to adjust their capital requirements to better account 
for the market risks of their activities.30 The Rule modified the 
existing market risk capital rule by adjusting the minimum 
risk-based capital calculation by the use of new measures of 
creditworthiness. It also: (1) modified the definition of covered 
positions to include assets that are in the trading book and held 
with the intent to trade; (2) introduced new requirements for 
the identification of trading positions and the management of 
covered positions; and (3) requires banks to have clearly 
defined policies and procedures for actively managed covered 
positions, for the prudent evaluation of covered positions, and 
for specific internal model validation standards.31  
 In summary, bank institutions are now also subject to 
the many statutory and regulatory provisions promulgated after 
the financial crisis of 2007-2009. As a result of these 
restrictions, there was a decided effort by many financial and 
investment institutions to avoid or bypass these onerous 
provisions.  
Shadow Banking 
 Shadow banking in essence operates by intermediation, 
the matching of lenders with savings to borrowers who need 
money by an agent or third party. The agent or third party had 
always been a bank, but now non-bank financial institutions 
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practice this intermediation outside of the traditional banking 
system. This type of intermediation lacks both the protections 
afforded to traditional or regular banks but also avoids onerous 
statutory and regulatory obligations. In traditional banking 
intermediation, banks received deposits from depositors which 
then are used to fund loans to borrowers. The FDIC, the 
Federal Reserve’s discount window, and other governmental 
guarantees offer relative financial safety to these deposits. In 
shadow banking financial intermediation, however, and in 
particular in credit intermediation, these guarantees are 
wanting. It was believed that this intermediation was safe 
because of credit lines and tail-risk insurance in the form of 
wraps and guarantees that included commercial banks and 
insurance companies. The forms of funding included 
securitizations such as mortgages, loans, and receivables that 
were combined into securities and tranches; and secured 
lending backed by mortgages and other assets.32   
Although having a serious downturn during the financial 
crisis of 2007-2009, it is conservatively estimated that non-
bank financial intermediation (“other financial intermediaries” 
[OFI]) grew to $75 trillion in 2014 having advanced by some 
$5 trillion from the prior year. OFI assets constituted 24 % of 
the total global financial assets, half of banking system assets, 
and 117% of GDP.33 At the end of 2012, the national 
jurisdictions hold assets of non-bank financial intermediaries 
were mainly the U.S. (37%); the Euro area (31%); the U.K. 
(12%); and China (3%).34 The Financial Stability Board 
(FSB)35 divided the OFI into sub-sectors as follows (a)other 
investment vehicles composed of “equity funds” ($9 trillion); 
“fixed-income/bond funds” ($7 trillion); “other  funds, i.e., 
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neither equity nor bond funds ($3 trillion); and  representing a 
total of $21 trillion and 35% of OFI assets (b)broker-dealers- 
$7 trillion or 12& of OFI, mainly concentrated in the United 
Kingdom (UK), U.S., Japan, Canada, and South Korea; (c) 
structured finance vehicles - $5 trillion held mainly in the U.S. 
and the U.K.; (d) finance companies ($4.5 trillion [8%]) and 
money market funds ($3.8 trillion (6%) mainly in the U.S. and 
the euro area); (e) hedge funds ($0.1 trillion [0.02%]) but the 
figure appears to be underestimated due to omission of off-
shore holdings; (f) jurisdiction-specific entities including Dutch 
special financing institutions, U.S. financial holding and 
funding companies.36 
 
RISKS AND REGULATION OF SHADOW BANKING 
 A central purpose of the Dodd-Frank Act is to prevent 
systemic risk to the entire financial system by entities that are 
“to-big-to-fail.” The designation clearly aimed at the several 
banks which controlled a vast percentage of deposits, any of 
which could bring about the financial collapse of the global 
financial system without governmental intervention. The 
question arose whether and to what extent shadow banking 
poses systemic risks to the financial community both within the 
U.S. and abroad. The collapse of Lehman Brothers caused the 
tightening of credit standards and banks became much more 
risk averse. Risks were then simply transferred from traditional 
banks to shadow banks which found it profitable to assume the 
risks that traditional banks were no longer able or desired to 
pursue.   Regulators had paid little attention to shadow banks 
and, as a result, payday loans, “crowdfunding,” securitized 
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products, money-market funds, and repurchase agreements 
became the province of shadow banking. Firms like 
Blackstone, Ceberus, and Avenue Capital stepped in to provide 
the capital for smaller companies.   
 The problem is that while some commentators such as 
Bill Winters, formerly of JP Morgan Chase and head of 
Renshaw Bay, a shadow banking company, believe that the rise 
of shadow banking is healthy to the economy, others such as 
Professor Steven Schwarcz of Duke University bemoaned the 
fact that Dodd-Frank focused on traditional banks and 
essentially ignored shadow banking. Schwarcz would remove 
the protection of limited liability of managers of shadow 
banking firms which creates moral hazard. Manages not having 
“skin in the game” are more likely to take risks that expose 
their firms to market failure. Most shadow banking firms are 
owned and operated by investor-managers who may profit 
extraordinarily form high risk exposure but have little to lose 
because of limited liability consequence.37 Similarly, Professor 
Richard Carnell of Fordham University believes that any 
confidence in shadow banking would be misplaced.38 
 The FSB suggested that systemic risk can arise from the 
interconnectedness between the banking sector and the shadow 
banking entities, both directly and indirectly. Shadow banking 
entities may be directly owned or benefit directly or indirectly 
by banks as part of the bank’s intermediation chain. There may 
be funding interdependence as, e.g., the holding of the assets 
such as debt securities of each other’s assets. There may be 
indirect interdependence and risk exposure as a result of 
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investments in similar assets or exposure to common 
counterparties.39  
 Scholars at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) 
dispute whether the Federal Reserve or the FSOC have the 
authority to regulate shadow banks. According to Peter J. 
Wallison of AEI and former counsel to President Ronald 
Reagan, the Dodd-Frank Act does not give either entity explicit 
power to regulate shadow banking.  Congress was concerned 
with large financial institutions that could pose prudential risk 
to the financial system and not with control of transactions with 
each other. They are carrying out the recommendations of the 
FSB particularly as they relate to money market mutual funds, 
which are the major source of short-term funding in the capital 
markets. FSOC designated the same three U.S. insurance firms 
(AIG, Prudential, and MetLife) that the FSB designated as 
systematically important financial firms (SIFIs). The FSB 
source of authority is contrary to statutory authority. Moreover, 
Title I of Dodd-Frank limits FSOC’s authority to firms it finds 
that their material distress or activities could cause instability 
to the U.S. financial system. Moreover, Title VIII of Dodd-
Frank gives FSOC the authority to designate firms as 
systematically important. Such power may introduce moral 
hazards into the relationship between clearing houses and firms 
using their services. Title VIII does not set forth standards to be 
applied in making this designation.40 
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CONCLUSION 
 The shadow banking system is a major component of 
our national and international financial system. The shadow 
banking system arose to meet credit demands. At this time the 
system arguably is financially greater and  more important than 
the traditional banking system. The Dodd-Frank Act and other 
financial regulations seek to prevent credit lending excesses 
that pose substantial risk to the overall financial system of the 
U.S. The relatively unregulated shadow banking system 
potentially does pose a systemic threat to the financial sector. 
As a result, it is incumbent upon Congress and other political 
actors to examine the complexity of the shadow banking 
system and initiate legislative and other actions to avoid yet 
another future crisis experienced less than a decade ago.      
Whether or not MetLife will prevail will depend 
ultimately on the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation 
concerning the limits of an administrative agency’s regulatory 
interpretation of the Dodd-Frank Act. In Chevron U.S.A., Inc. 
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 
(1984), the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the Environmental 
Protection Agency’s interpretation of the Clean Air Act of 
1977. In doing so, it engaged in a two-part analysis (called the 
"Chevron two-step test"), where a reviewing court determines:  
(a) First, always, is the question whether Congress has 
spoken directly to the precise question at issue. If the 
intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; 
for the court as well as the agency must give effect to 
the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. 
If the Court determines Congress has not directly 
addressed the precise question at issue, the court does 
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not simply impose its own construction of the statute 
….  
(b) [I]f the statute is silent or ambiguous with 
respect to the specific question, the issue for the 
court is whether the agency's answer is based on 
a permissible construction of the statute41.  
 
 The Chevron analysis was upheld in Barnhart v. 
Walton.42 The Barnhart decision reversed the Court of Appeals 
and upheld the interpretation of the Social Security 
Administration with respect to the denial of disability benefits 
to individuals who are unable to engage in any substantial 
gainful activity unless the impairment has lasted or is expect to 
last for a continuous period of 2 months. The Court of Appeals 
had interpreted the statute that the 12-month period referred to 
impairment and not inability to so engage. The Chevron 
analysis appears to be limited to a formal adjudication or 
notice-and-comment rulemaking. “Interpretations such as those 
in opinion letters-like interpretations contained in policy 
statements, agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines, all of 
which lack the force of law do not warrant Chevron-style 
deference.”43 The reason for the limitation given by the 
Supreme Court is that internal agency guidelines are not 
subject to the “rigors” of the Administrative Procedure Act, 
which includes notice and comment.44  
Scholars and financial analysts disagree whether 
MetLife will succeed in its effort to thwart the efforts of FSOC. 
The company’s shares declined slightly the day it instituted the 
action dropping 1.2% to $49.81/share. A senior analyst with 
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MetLife shareholder Snow Capital Management LP, Anna 
Wickland, believed that the litigation would go nowhere. 
Michael Barr, a University of Michigan law professor who 
assisted in the creation of the Dodd-Frank Act, indicated that 
MetLife faced a difficult legal battle to overturn the 
designation but Thomas Vartanian, chairman of the law firm of 
Dechert LLP that specializes in actions brought before the 
oversight council disagrees with the negative views and stated 
that MetLife had an excellent chance of prevailing in the 
litigation.45  
 
 In the light of the importance of shadow banking to our 
financial system and referring to previous Supreme Court cases 
delineating the powers of administrative agencies, it appears 
that MetLife should and will be regulated. Negotiations 
between MetLife and the Council, however, continue to this 
day with no resolution of the controversy, despite wide-spread 
consensus that MetLife and other nonbank financial 
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